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Abstract
The House of Lords decision in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane 
[2006] UKHL 24 edges us closer to a community of property approach 
to ancillary relief on divorce where assets exceed needs.
Drawing on an empirical project funded by the Nuffield Foundation, 
this paper will consider whether discretion has had its day and should 
be replaced by a formal community of property regime in England 
and Wales.
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Introduction
The beginning of the 21st century has been a turbulent time in the 
previously quiet world of financial provision following divorce in 
England and Wales.  Marriage is typically an economic as well as an 
emotional relationship involving financial dependency or inter-
dependency, especially where there are children.  One spouse will 
often make financial sacrifices by giving up their job or taking part-
time work in order to care for children or elderly relatives; or perhaps 
to fit in with the demands of the other spouse’s career for the benefit 
of the family as a whole.  English family law has recognised this and 
among its traditional functions has been the need to protect the more 
dependant, weaker economic spouse (typically but not always the 
wife) when relationships break down.  However, unlike the position in 
other European jurisdictions where marriage by law creates a shared 
‘community of property’, traditionally this protection did not (either 
during the marriage or on divorce) extend to granting the dependent 
wife an automatic and equal share in family assets which had 
principally been earned or purchased by the breadwinning husband. 
Rather, a wife1 would, only on divorce and at the court’s discretion,
1 Note that although the typical situation where the husband is the family’s main 
breadwinner and the wife is the main homemaker and primary carer of any children 
is depicted throughout this piece, orders for financial provision on divorce can be 
made in favour of or against either spouse and the statutory provisions are 
intended to be gender-neutral.
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 be awarded a sum sufficient to meet her ‘reasonable requirements’,2 
judged in the context of the family’s standard of living and other 
statutory criteria.3
In two radical decisions, White v White4 (hereafter White) in 2001 and 
Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane5 (hereafter Miller; McFarlane) in 
2006, the House of Lords has now, in recognition of new notions of 
‘fairness’, revolutionised the approach of the courts to financial 
provision on divorce in two particular ways.  First it has declared that 
financial contributions should not ‘trump’ non-financial contributions 
to the welfare of the family when deciding how assets should be 
divided following divorce, as to do so is discriminatory.  Second, it has 
introduced a principle of equal sharing of family assets which 
according to some commentators amounts to a judicially created 
system of deferred community of property previously unknown to 
English law.6  
Drawing on an empirical project funded by the Nuffield Foundation, 
this article will consider whether discretion has had its day and should 
be replaced by a formal community of property regime in England 
and Wales. 
Family property, marriage and divorce - The English context
In England and Wales, couple relationships, including entering a 
marriage or registering a same-sex civil partnership, have no direct or 
immediate effect on either partner’s property which continues, during 
the relationship, to be owned separately by each partner unless 
specifically purchased jointly.  However, this does not mean that on 
divorce each party leaves with their own property in tact plus a share 
2 See Dart v Dart [1996] 2 FLR 286.
3 These are set out in s25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
4 [2001] 1 AC 596.
5 [2006] UKHL 24.
6 See S. Cretney, ‘Community of property imposed by judicial decision’ (2003) 119 
LQR 349.
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of anything jointly owned.  Rather, Part II of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 provides that both spouses’ property is in principle available 
for redistribution at the discretion of the court.  The court has power 
on divorce to make orders for periodical maintenance payments out 
of income, for lump sums, property adjustment orders and 
settlements of property which it does according to a list of statutory 
criteria contained in s25 of the 1973 Act.  These are very broad and 
include - all the circumstances of the case; the standard of living 
during the marriage; the age of the parties and duration of the 
marriage; the parties’ respective current and future income, assets, 
needs and resources, as well as financial and non-financial 
contributions made and likely to be made to the welfare of the family 
by each of the parties and finally conduct it would be inequitable to 
disregard.  There is no overarching statutory principle7 guiding the 
application of criteria other than the direction that the welfare of any 
children of the family must be the court’s first consideration.  There is 
also a duty to consider whether it is possible to achieve a ‘clean 
break’ between the parties.8  In White, the House of Lords attempted 
to fill the vacuum by interpreting s25 so as to include an overall goal 
of ‘fairness.’ According to District Judge Roger Bird, the approach of 
the courts before White was to meet the housing needs of the 
primary carer and the children and then the other reasonable needs 
of the both parties if possible.  Once these were met, then in is his 
view there was ‘no justification for further adjustment by the court.’9 
In Dart v Dart10 in 1996, the Court of Appeal had rejected the notion 
that there was any principle of equal division even of assets acquired 
by joint efforts – rather a wife’s claim was limited to a ceiling of her 
7 The original guidance – the minimal loss principle - was that the court had a duty 
to place each of the parties as nearly as possible in the position they would have 
been in if the marriage had not broken down.  This was repealed in 1984 as it was 
impractable.
8 S25A states that ‘it shall be the duty of the court to consider whether it would be 
appropriate so to exercise those powers that the financial obligations of each party 
towards the other will be terminated as soon after the grant of the decree as the 
court considers just and reasonable.’
9 R. Bird, Ancillary Relief Outcomes’ [2000] Fam Law 831.
10 [1996] 2 FLR 286.
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‘reasonable requirements’, which were calculated in the context of 
the standard of living during the marriage.  
In White, the House of Lords in considering what ‘fairness’ entailed 
took a different view.  It decided it must involve a principle of non-
discrimination as between breadwinners and homemakers, alongside 
a move towards equal sharing.  The division of assets (but not 
income) was in each case to be measured against ‘a yardstick of 
equality’, and equality should only be departed from where it could 
be justified.  Lord Nicholls set out the radical new thinking:11 
If, in their different spheres, each contributed equally to the 
family, then in principle it matters not which of them earned 
the money and built up the assets. There should be no bias 
in favour of the money-earner and against the home-maker 
and the child-carer.
The Whites were farmers and had had a 33 year marriage.  Mrs White 
had worked as an equal partner alongside Mr White in their multi-
million pound farming business as well as having cared for their three 
children and undertaken the homemaking role.  Despite this, and the 
new rhetoric, she received 40% of the assets which was more than 
her ‘reasonable requirements’ but less than an equal share, on the 
basis that some of the farmland had been inherited by Mr White alone 
and this constituted a reason to depart from equality.  There followed 
a number of cases in which the grounds for departing from equality 
were explored.  In Cowan v Cowan12 equality was departed from 
where a ‘stellar’ contribution to the family assets had been made by 
in this case Mr Cowan, the inventor of the drawstring dustbin bag. 
However, the later case of Lambert v Lambert 13 confirmed that 
merely being a very good businessman would not justify such a 
11 [2006] UKHL 24 at 605.
12 [2001] 2 FCR 332.
13 [2002] 3 FCR 673.
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departure from equality as this would be to readmit discrimination by 
the backdoor.  In Lambert the Court of Appeal found that the 
extensive capital assets should be divided equally between the 
spouses who had performed very different roles within the marriage. 
The Court of Appeal emphasised the importance of non-discrimination 
citing with approval the equality approach taken in an earlier High 
Court decision where:
The husband’s role was the more glamorous, interesting and 
exciting one.  The wife’s involved the more mundane daily round 
of the consistent carer.  That was the way that the parties to this 
marriage chose, between themselves, to organise the overall 
matrimonial division of labour.  How can it be said fairly, at the end 
of the day, that one role was more useful or valuable (let alone 
special or outstanding) than the other in terms of the overall 
benefit to he marriage partnership or to the family?14
As Eekelaar15 observed, post-White there was a move away from the 
language of a welfare-style dependency construction of a wife’s 
needs or reasonable requirements towards a new entitlement basis, 
with entitlement having been earned through the non-financial 
contributions of home-making and childcare.  In some senses this 
meant that English law had developed a greater resonance with the 
community of property approach in that a spouse gains post-Lambert 
a prima facie equal share in the family assets as of right.
Fairness as objectively judged by the court is still the primary goal in 
financial provision cases and does not always justify an equal division 
of assets.  It has still to be achieved by weighing up in any case the 
substantive criteria contained in s25.  How such an elusive concept 
should be construed by the courts was developed further by the 
House of Lords in Miller; McFarlane.  This involved two very different 
14 Per Thorpe LJ in Lambert v Lambert [2002] EWCA Civ 1685 at para. 22 citing 
Coleridge J in G v G at that time unreported.
15 J. Eekelaar,  ‘Back to basics and forward into the Unknown’ [2001] Fam Law 30.
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cases which the House of Lords heard together and provided an 
opportunity to attempt to clarify the principles governing this area of 
law.  Their conclusion was that there are three strands of fairness 
which the court has to address.  These are needs, compensation and 
equal sharing.  Thus in addition to addressing the parties’ needs as 
stipulated in s25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and to applying the 
yardstick of equality to sharing assets in a non-discriminatory way in 
order to achieve fairness as set out in White, the House of Lords 
stipulated that a third rationale for making a financial provision award 
on divorce was compensation for ‘relationship-generated 
disadvantage’.16  Whilst overlapping with need, this aims to achieve 
fairness by compensating for loss suffered by undertaking 
homemaking and childcare within marriage at the expense say of a 
spouse’s labour market value.  
In the case of McFarlane, the wife had given up her career as a 
successful city solicitor in order to care for the parties’ three children 
during a 19 year marriage, whereas her husband’s career had 
flourished.  This was clearly a case for compensation over and above 
her needs, so the court found, notwithstanding the fact that s25 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 makes no mention of compensation. 
Furthermore, where necessary, compensation could be awarded out 
of income as maintenance, not just from capital assets.  
Miller, in contrast, involved a childless marriage of less than two years 
between a multi-millionaire and a professional woman who gave up 
her £85,000 p.a. job on marriage in order to take on the role of 
homemaker. The divorce granted on grounds of the husband’s 
adultery allowed Mrs Miller to be awarded £5 million of the husband’s 
total worth estimated at £32 million.  It was accepted here that she 
had not suffered very much relationship-generated disadvantage, but 
she had been used to an extremely high standard of living during the 
marriage and much of the wealth had been generated during the 
16 See judgment of Baroness Hale [2006] UKHL 24 at para. 140.
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marriage, albeit by the husband’s efforts.  The court nonetheless 
firmly rejected the earlier approach of placing the parties back into 
the financial position they were in before the marriage but did 
indicate that the parties’ assets should be divided into ‘matrimonial 
and non-matrimonial’ assets17, which again is a distinction which 
chimes with the community of property approach.  Broadly, it was 
stated that the matrimonial assets would be automatically available 
for equal sharing on divorce but that the division of the non-
matrimonial assets would depend on other factors such as the length 
of the marriage, whether or not it was inherited and the extent of the 
parties’ respective needs and other financial resources.  The House of 
Lords also rejected the Court of Appeal’s approach in Miller that Mrs 
Miller should be compensated financially for her husband’s bad 
conduct in having an affair which had thwarted her legitimate 
expectation of the continuation of the marriage, except insofar as her 
loss of their affluent standard of living could be taken into account. 
Only ‘obvious and gross’ conduct would affect the financial award, 
however unfair this might seem to those involved.  Mrs Miller did not 
get an equal share of the total assets after a two year marriage, but 
she did get much more than her ‘reasonable requirements.’ 
Unfortunately, in approving the global award of the Court of Appeal, 
the House of Lords did not set out how exactly they had shared out 
the matrimonial and non-matrimonial assets to arrive at the 
appropriateness of £5 million.
This latest authority has therefore reinforced the principle of non-
discrimination between breadwinner and homemaker/childcarer.  In 
addition, although both Miller and McFarlane were clearly both so-
called ‘big-money’ cases, the House of Lords did consider the 
application of the new principles in lower asset cases where assets do 
not exceed the parties’ needs.  Here, it was made clear that all assets 
should first be applied to meeting the parties’ and children’s needs. 
17 It should be noted that the Law Lords did not agree a definition of which assets 
were included in which category and indeed Baroness Hale preferred to contrast 
‘family and non-family assets’.
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In these situations, an equal division of assets might discriminate 
against the non-breadwinning spouse, and so a bigger award 
exceeding 50 per cent of the total assets whether matrimonial or non-
matrimonial may be appropriate for the spouse who will continue to 
be the primary carer of the children to ensure that their and the 
children’s housing needs were met.18
As can be seen, the very wide discretion afforded the courts makes 
likely outcomes difficult to predict in this field despite the House of 
Lords’ best efforts to clarify the principles.  Furthermore, any pre-
nuptial agreement made in order to protect a spouse’s property is not 
necessarily enforceable on divorce.19  Both of these issues are in stark 
contrast to the position in European community of property 
jurisdictions.
Family Property, marriage and divorce – the European context
In a ‘community of property’ system, on marriage or civil partnership, 
unless or until a couple specifically and formally agree otherwise, 
each spouse’s relevant property (as defined by law in each 
jurisdiction) and all post-marriage debt becomes jointly owned and on 
divorce must be shared (almost always equally) between them.20 
This effect on property may be either immediate (taking effect on 
marriage) or deferred (taking effect on divorce or death), and may 
extend to all or just some of the parties’ assets, depending on the 
rules of the jurisdiction.
18 Per Lord Nicholls [2006] UKHL 24 at para. 12 - 14.
19 The courts have vacillated in their approach to pre-nuptial agreements.  Whilst at 
one time they were considered contrary to public policy and still cannot oust the 
jurisdiction of the court, they should now be had regard to as one of the 
circumstances of the case and may be enforced where entered into freely and not 
immediately prior to the wedding and where the parties have had independent 
legal advice.  See K v K (Ancillary Relief: Pre-nuptial Agreement) [2002] Fam Law 
877.
20 The only exceptions are other parts of the UK and Ireland.
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What this also means is that on divorce, property (and debt) is either 
shared between the parties in accordance with the agreement made 
opting out of the community of property regime at the time of their 
marriage/partnership registration; or the assets which are legally 
defined as ‘community property’ are shared equally (almost without 
exception) between the parties.  Either way, the terms on which the 
property is divided are clear and there can be no dispute about this, 
however substantively unfair it may seem at the point of divorce to 
either party when considering their contributions to the relationship 
or their post-divorce needs.  In Europe, the certainty of clearly 
knowing what is “yours”, “mine” or “ours” throughout the course of 
the relationship, from beginning to end under the default community 
regime which applies, and the ability for the parties to opt out if that 
does not seem appropriate is seen as the priority and the certainty 
itself is seen as equating with fairness.  Periodical maintenance 
payments are the only way in which relationship generated needs can 
be addressed and are dealt with quite separately from the division of 
capital assets in Europe.
Lessons from Europe?
From an English perspective, the idea of such certainty rather than 
endless discretion and uncertainty holds some attraction.  Yet would it 
be right to abandon substantive fairness as the court’s guiding 
principle?  In order better to gauge public opinion in England and 
Wales and to consider what community of property might have to 
offer this jurisdiction, a collaborative socio-legal empirical research 
project funded by the Nuffield Foundation21 was undertaken to find 
out more about the way different types of community of property 
21 The project was conducted with colleagues from Reading University.  The full 
project findings are reported in E. Cooke, A. Barlow and T. Callus, Community of 
Property: A Regime for England and Wales?, 2006, Bristol: Policy Press.
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regime operate in practice and to explore how attractive this might 
be to people in Britain.22
The first stage of the research involved a series of semi-structured 
interviews with 30 family law notaries and lawyers in France, The 
Netherlands and Sweden. Ten were selected from each jurisdiction 
for their specialisation either in matrimonial regime advice or divorce 
law.  These three jurisdictions were chosen as they broadly represent 
the range of community systems in Europe.  The Netherlands 
operates a full immediate community system, embracing all assets 
whether acquired before or after the marriage or registered 
partnership (both of which are open to same- and different-sex 
couples), and thus subject to contracting out, all assets, effectively 
become jointly owned.  The overall impression gained from notaries 
and family lawyers in The Netherlands was one of broad satisfaction 
with the system, and of a feeling that its all-embracing nature has the 
tremendous advantage of simplicity. The sharing of post-marriage 
debt was viewed as an acceptable quid pro quo for the sharing of 
assets.  
France on the other hand operates a different form of immediate 
community on marriage, embracing only after-acquired property.  In 
France we gained a rather more negative view of the practicalities of 
community of property from our sample of notaries and lawyers. In 
particular, while post-marriage debt-sharing was a fully accepted part 
of the immediate community regime, people in general were reported 
to be unaware of the need to take advice about opting-out of the 
default regime in appropriate situations.
Sweden,  though,  in  common  with  the  other  Scandinavian 
jurisdictions, offers a deferred community of property regime.  This 
means that  only  on  divorce  or  death does  the  equal  sharing  of 
community assets take effect and unlike in The Netherlands or France 
22 The research proposal was formulated prior to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and 
thus did not specifically consider same-sex civil partners in England and Wales.  It 
did look at how cohabiting couples were treated in community of property regimes 
but that is beyond the scope of this article.
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there is provision in short marriages of less than five years to depart 
from equal division  where  it  appears  unjust  to  the owner of  the 
majority  of  assets.23  Here  the  highest  level  of  perceived client 
satisfaction among lawyers was found.
In considering the suitability of an immediate community of property 
regime for England and Wales, it was concluded from this first phase 
of the study that the automatic sharing of debt under such a system 
was unlikely to be appropriate and there might well be an ideological 
problem with an immediate community system. Whilst its original 
rationale was to protect women, by giving them an automatic share 
in the family’s wealth to compensate for their inability to feather the 
nest because they were sitting on it, this sits uneasily nowadays with 
the independence of women.  This has led Scandinavian jurisdictions 
to move to deferred community systems where the spouses continue 
to own their own property separately during the marriage but it is 
shared on divorce. 
The Swedish system of deferred community perhaps has more 
resonance with the English system, already described as a judicially 
created system of deferred community of property after the White 
decision,24 and which is perhaps even more apt after the recent 
suggested distinction in the House of Lords between ‘matrimonial 
assets’ automatically shared on divorce and ‘non-matrimonial assets’ 
which are less likely to be redistributed on divorce.25  Those EU 
nationals who live and thus often own property in a member state 
other than their own are also presented with difficulties arising out of 
a conflict of laws, particularly at the point of divorce.  This has put 
harmonisation of family law within Europe on the agenda of the 
23 Swedish Marriage Code, chapter 12 and guidance in the Codes Travaux 
Preparatoires, 1986/87: I pp. 184-190.
24 Cretney, 2003, op cit note 5.
25 See Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 per Lord Nicholls. 
Baroness Hale refers confusingly to family assets and non-family assets.
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European Commission26.  How well or ill would this sit with people’s 
perceptions of fairness on divorce in Britain?
To explore this, the second phase of the study involved 75 interviews 
with a purposive sample of men and women drawn in equal measure 
from our three study areas Reading, Swansea and Liverpool.  These 
represented high-cost, mid-range and low-cost housing markets in 
England and Wales as it was felt that the value of the family home 
and the ability to re-house both partners following divorce may affect 
people’s views.  Whilst this was not a nationally representative 
sample, the sample was purposively selected from a random 
sampling frame to reflect a whole spectrum of respondents balanced 
between different socio-economic groups, age, gender, relationship 
status/experience in order to access a wide range of views.  Using a 
“grounded theory”,27 approach we were interested in particular in 
how our respondents considered financial matters ought to be 
regulated on divorce.  A mixture of direct attitudinal questions and 
vignettes married and divorcing couples with and without children 
were used in this context.
Project Findings
Our first line of inquiry was to consider the issue of the automatic 
sharing of debt in an immediate community of property regime as in 
France or The Netherlands.
We looked at identical situations for a married couple with and 
without children in which the husband contracted a large debt for the 
purchase of a yacht. We asked our interviewees whether or not his 
creditors should be able to satisfy the debt using the whole of the 
equity of the shared family home which was jointly owned and 
whether or not they should be able to access his wife’s earnings. 
26 See http://europa.eu.int/search/search.s97.vts.
27 Glasyer, BG and Strauss, AL (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Chicago; 
Aldine de Gruyter.
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Where the scenario couples had no children, only, thirteen of the 73 
respondents who answered this question thought that the wife’s 
earnings should be available to the husband’s creditors, as they 
would in an immediate community system.  There was even greater 
resistance to the wife’s share of the jointly owned home being 
available to satisfy the debt, with some taking the view that the 
husband’s share should also be protected from creditors because it 
was a family home.  There was therefore a clear rejection of the 
liability consequences of an immediate community system.  
We then went on to consider views on automatic joint ownership of 
assets including the home, which the Law Commission of England and 
Wales had recommended some 30 years ago,28 but which had never 
been implemented.
We found support, in a small rather than an overwhelming majority, 
for the idea in the abstract that marriage should entail automatic joint 
ownership of property with 50 agreeing but 21 of whom had 
conditions or reservations such as the non-owning spouse making a 
contribution, or relating to the length of the marriage   A very similar 
majority (49 to 22) was in favour of automatic joint ownership of 
earnings, and a smaller one (45 to 28 with some qualified agreement) 
in favour of automatic joint ownership of the family home. Views were 
evenly divided as to whether or not an inheritance should be 
automatically (that is, by law rather than by choice) shared with one’s 
spouse.
A majority of those who were initially against shared ownership 
changed their view when asked, again in the abstract, whether or not 
their views would differ if the couple had children.  In doing so, most 
seemed to refer to the family home rather than to earnings, and 
many gave one or both of two reasons for their change of view. One 
common reason was in order to safeguard a home for the children; 
28 Law Commission 1973. First Report on Family Property: A New Approach Law Com 
no. 52 HMSO, London; Law Commission 1978. Third Report on Family Property: The 
Matrimonial Home Co-ownership and Occupation Rights) and Household Goods) 
Law Com no. 86 HMSO, London.
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and the other was to ensure that the children would eventually inherit 
some or all of the family home. However, neither of these is actually 
particularly relevant in assessing whether or not automatic joint 
ownership is an appropriate reform of English law and the project 
concluded again that there were not strong enough reasons to go 
down this route.  Keeping a roof over the children’s heads can be and 
is commonly achieved in English family law by other means;29 and the 
jurisdiction’s commitment to freedom of testamentary disposition 
makes safe-guarding inheritance for children a matter of individual 
choice.  Added to this are the practical difficulties allied to our 
conveyancing and Land Registration system that make it very 
problematic to effectively introduce legal joint ownership at the point 
of marriage or civil partnership registration without some great 
technological advances in successfully joining up computerised public 
record systems.  Automatic beneficial joint ownership would be 
possible but would not achieve the ends the interview sample 
seemed keen to see and would have the disadvantage of shrouding 
home ownership in uncertainty, not something which mortgagees 
would wish to see.
On balance, it was concluded that whilst it would have been a very 
useful reform in the 1960s or 1970s when unlike today the 
matrimonial home was commonly placed in the sole name of the 
husband rather than joint names,30 it is not one where the gains 
outweigh the drawbacks at this moment in time.  Would a Swedish-
style deferred community of property regime have more to offer 
England and Wales and how would it be viewed?
We explored deferred community of property by developing the 
vignettes for a married couple who had each been together for seven 
29 Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and Schedule 1 of the Children 
Act 1989, both give ample scope for the settlement of property, typically until 
children leave home, as in Mesher v Mesher & Hall [1980] 1 All ER 126, CA. 
30 The case of Gissing v Gissing [1971] 3 WLR 255 is an illustration of the hardship 
caused to wives as a result of this before the court first had power to redistribute 
capital assets on divorce under the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970.
15
years, both worked with the husband earning significantly more and 
where the family home had been purchased by the husband subject 
to mortgage prior to the marriage.  We asked what the outcome 
should be with regard to the family home if the relationship broke 
down, first where the couple had no children, and second where they 
had two children aged 6 and 4 and we specified options reflecting 
possible legal outcomes.
Where there were no children, just under half (34) thought that the 
house should be sold and the proceeds divided equally in line with 
the idea of deferred community of property.  Interestingly, though, 
even though this was a marriage, the majority (37) thought the home 
should be divided according to contribution and not equally.  Thus 
there is some ambivalence about the extent to which marriage itself 
without any direct financial contribution to property and where there 
were no children should trigger an equal division.  This is perhaps in 
tune with some of the hostile public reaction to the childless Mrs 
Miller being awarded a significant share of her breadwinning 
husband’s assets.
However, in exploring views where our couples had children, we 
found a marked consensus in favour of deferred community with an 
equal sharing of assets.  However, the majority of these respondents 
indicated that the provision of a home for the children and their carer 
should take precedence over all other considerations, with most 
people agreeing that the wife and children should be able to stay in 
the home until the children reached 18 before the proceeds of sale of 
the home were divided equally between the former spouses.  This 
typifies the responses:
“I think she should be allowed to stay in the house 
until the children are older and then the property sold.
Q: And in what sort of shares?
A: Again, I think it should be an equal split.
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Q: And why do you feel that?
A: Because she’s had the major responsibility of bringing up 
the children.”31
Our analysis showed that those who dissented from the majority view 
were all divorced or former cohabitant men who felt that the financial 
contribution should determine how the home was disposed of and as 
the husband had owned the home prior to the relationship the wife 
should have no interest in it.
Does community of property have anything to offer England 
and Wales?
Let us now consider this in the light of the research findings explored 
above.
Do we have it already?
First it can be seen that whilst England and Wales has moved 
towards a deferred community of property approach due to the 
yardstick of equality in White and the new distinction between 
matrimonial and non-matrimonial assets in Miller; McFarlane, this is 
not a true community of property regime.  There are many factors 
which make this clear.  First, such an approach as we have only 
applies where assets exceed needs, it is not universal.  Further, our 
system is still over-laden with a large amount of discretion far 
exceeding anything available even in the Swedish model and we deal 
with capital and maintenance redistribution together, using a needs-
based rationale, again unheard of in any European community regime 
where capital and maintenance are completely separate issues and 
only the latter is guided by need.  As for equal sharing, for most 
English and Welsh divorcing couples equal division does not happen 
as there are many reasons to depart from equality. For Swedish 
couples it is the norm, which may be departed from only where the 
31 Interview L23, female married 51-60.
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marriage is short. What is more, in England and Wales there is no 
agreed definition of matrimonial assets and it is not possible to opt 
out of the community regime, both essential features of community 
that are lacking, at least for the present. 
Could/should England and Wales have a community regime?
The next question is therefore whether a formal community regime 
would be useful to our jurisdiction given the criticisms of the 
discretionary system we have.  Let us consider the advantages and 
disadvantages.
Summary of attractions of deferred community of property.  
 Such a regime would reflect the approach in Miller and 
McFarlane of identifying ‘matrimonial assets’, but would put it 
on a statutory footing. We would then know exactly which 
assets were ‘yours’, or ‘mine’ or ‘ours’.  
 Equal division has an instinctive appeal in the popular 
imagination as a ‘fair’ solution, particularly where there are 
children.
 Deferred community could achieve greater simplicity and 
certainty and could promote agreement or mediation rather 
than litigation in financial disputes on relationship breakdown; 
 Certainty might be the new fairness, given that uncertainty is 
viewed as unjust.
However, might we risk going out of the frying pan into the fire?
Summary of drawbacks of deferred community of property
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 Deferred community is an entitlement-based rather than a 
needs-based redistribution of assets, which may cause financial 
hardship particularly due to its lack of flexibility.  
 A deferred community regime with a principled egalitarian 
approach could lose sight of the children’s welfare and might be 
achieved at the expense of meeting children’s housing needs, 
which the interview sample were clear should not be the case.  
Where does the balance lie?
This, of course, was a big issue for the research project and our data 
as seen above send conflicting messages. It was attempted to build a 
model of deferred community of property which incorporated need.32 
However, whilst this worked well at the top end of the asset scale, it 
did not improve upon the current system at the lower end and 
reluctantly it was felt it could not be pursued further to any good 
effect.
A major reason identified for the difficulties of adapting to a 
community regime lies in the British housing market. This country is 
heavily committed to owner-occupation, and rented accommodation 
is hard to find and either expensive and/or poor quality in the private 
and social housing sectors. Most people require capital in some form 
to meet their need for a home. 
Traditionally, the European housing market has been rather different. 
Far more people rent, and therefore meet their housing needs out of 
income. In that environment, a system which divides capital without 
reference to needs, while responding to needs through maintenance 
awards, makes far more sense.33 
32 See Cooke et al, 2006, op cit n 21.
33 Available figures from 1999 show that in the UK only 10% of households rent 
compared to 36% in Germany, 21% in France, 17% in The Netherlands and 16% in 
Sweden – see further A. Oswald, ‘The Housing Market and Europe’s 
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Conclusion
In practical terms, it seems it would be very difficult to introduce any 
formal principle of equal division of assets on divorce for any except 
the very rich, without abandoning meeting both parties’ housing 
needs and those of the children as the principal priority guiding 
financial provision on divorce.  Thus unless and until it is possible to 
adequately deal with need exclusively from income, there are no 
obvious advantages to introducing a classical model deferred 
community regime despite the attractions of the Swedish system. 
Before reaching a final conclusion on this, however, the New Zealand 
model should be further investigated were England and Wales ever to 
seriously consider the introduction of community of property as it is a 
jurisdiction which recently moved from a discretionary system similar 
to that of England and Wales to a Community of Property regime.34  It 
manages to combine a principle of equal sharing with elements of 
need or at least compensation-based discretion,35 although it, too, 
Unemployment’, Warwick University, 1999 available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/oswald/homesnt.pdf. 
Owner occupation rates in 2001 were 43% Germany, 63% France, 53% The 
Netherlands, 60% Sweden compared to 71% in the UK (see further ESRC Society 
Today Fact Sheet on Housing in the UK, 2005 available at 
http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/facts/UK/index43.aspx?Compone
ntId=12642&SourcePageId=14975.  This means that there is greater cultural 
acceptance of renting in other European jurisdictions which combines with lower 
average house prices.  Thus at the lower end of the income and asset scale, more 
people accept the need to rent whereas in the UK this is resisted due to the very 
high pressured and generally rising owner occupation housing market, where the 
family home is also a financial investment for the future.  We have therefore 
proportionately more owner occupiers who become financially stretched on divorce. 
34 See New Zealand’s Property (Relationships) Act 1996 as amended.
35 The Property (Relationships) Act 1996 as amended has equal sharing as a starting 
principle but subject to a large number of exceptions.  These include separate rules 
for short marriages (ss14 & 14A); a discretion where equal sharing of community 
assets would be repugnant to justice to share assets according to contributions to 
the relationship (s13); and a claim for compensation paid from separate property 
over and above the equal share of community assets in order to alleviate economic 
disparity but only where one party’s income and standard of living is likely to be 
significantly higher than the others and this is attributable to the division of 
functions during the relationship (s15). Note that again ‘needs’ other than 
compensation are met out of maintenance awards out of income alone (s 64 Family 
Proceedings Act 1980) but that it is possible to allow the parent with care to remain 
in the family home with the children (ss 26, 26A, 33(d) Property (Relationships Act) 
1976).
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has been subject to criticism.36  For the time being, though, it seems 
those getting divorced in Britain will continue to have a far less clear 
idea of their post-divorce entitlement than their European 
counterparts, although they may at least cling on to the hope that the 
eventual outcome will be fair.
36 See J. Miles, ‘Principles or Pragmatism in Ancillary Relief; the virtues of flirting 
with academic theories and other jurisdictions.’ 19 (2005) IJLF 242.
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